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Abstract. As realistic facial manipulation technologies have achieved
remarkable progress, social concerns about potential malicious abuse of
these technologies bring out an emerging research topic of face forgery
detection. However, it is extremely challenging since recent advances are
able to forge faces beyond the perception ability of human eyes, especially
in compressed images and videos. We find that mining forgery patterns
with the awareness of frequency could be a cure, as frequency provides
a complementary viewpoint where either subtle forgery artifacts or com-
pression errors could be well described. To introduce frequency into the
face forgery detection, we propose a novel Frequency in Face Forgery
Network (F3-Net), taking advantages of two different but complemen-
tary frequency-aware clues, 1) frequency-aware decomposed image com-
ponents, and 2) local frequency statistics, to deeply mine the forgery
patterns via our two-stream collaborative learning framework. We apply
DCT as the applied frequency-domain transformation. Through compre-
hensive studies, we show that the proposed F3-Net significantly outper-
forms competing state-of-the-art methods on all compression qualities
in the challenging FaceForensics++ dataset, especially wins a big lead
upon low-quality media.
Keywords: Face Forgery Detection, Frequency, Collaborative Learning
1 Introduction
Rapid development of deep learning driven generative models [26,8,34,35,11]
enables an attacker to create, manipulate or even forge the media of a human
face (i.e., images and videos, etc.) that cannot be distinguished even by human
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eyes. However, malicious distribution of forged media would cause security issues
and even crisis of confidence in our society. Therefore, it is supremely important
to develop effective face forgery detection methods.
Various methods [3,33,45,46,43,58,60,30] have been proposed to detect the
forged media. A series of earlier works relied on hand-crafted features e.g., lo-
cal pattern analysis [21], noise variances evaluation [47] and steganalysis fea-
tures [13,24] to discover forgery patterns and magnify faint discrepancy between
real and forged images. Deep learning introduces another pathway to tackle
this challenge, recent learning-based forgery detection methods [14,12] tried to
mine the forgery patterns in feature space using convolutional neural networks
(CNNs), having achieved remarkable progresses on public datasets, e.g., Face-
Forensics++ [50].
Current state-of-the-art face manipulation algorithms, such as DeepFake [1],
FaceSwap [2], Face2Face [56] and NeuralTextures [55], have been able to con-
ceal the forgery artifacts, so that it becomes extremely difficult to discover the
flaws of these refined counterfeits, as shown in Fig. 1(a). What’s worse, if the
visual quality of a forged face is tremendously degraded, such as compressed
by JPEG or H.264 with a large compression ratio, the forgery artifacts will be
contaminated by compression error, and sometimes cannot be captured in RGB
domain any more. Fortunately, these artifacts can be captured in frequency do-
main, as many prior studies suggested [58,38,32,19,57], in the form of unusual
frequency distributions when compared with real faces. However, how to involve
frequency-aware clues into the deeply learned CNN models? This question also
raises alongside. Conventional frequency domains, such as FFT and DCT, do
not match the shift-invariance and local consistency owned by nature images,
thus vanilla CNN structures might be infeasible. As a result, CNN-compatible
frequency representation becomes pivotal if we would like to leverage the dis-
criminative representation power of learnable CNNs for frequency-aware face
forgery detection. To this end, we would like to introduce two frequency-aware
forgery clues that are compatible with the knowledge mining by deep convolu-
tional networks.
From one aspect, it is possible to decompose an image by separating its
frequency signals, while each decomposed image component indicates a certain
band of frequencies. The first frequency-aware forgery clue is thus discovered
by the intuition that we are able to identify subtle forgery artifacts that are
somewhat salient (i.e., in the form of unusual patterns) in the decomposed com-
ponents with higher frequencies, as the examples shown in the middle column
of Fig. 1(b). This clue is compatible with CNN structures, and is surprisingly
robust to compression artifacts. From the other aspect, the decomposed image
components describe the frequency-aware patterns in the spatial domain, but not
explicitly render the frequency information directly in the neural networks. We
suggest the second frequency-aware forgery clue as the local frequency statistics.
In each densely but regularly sampled local spatial patch, the statistics is gath-
ered by counting the mean frequency responses at each frequency band. These
frequency statistics re-assemble back to a multi-channel spatial map, where the
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Fig. 1. Frequency-aware tampered clues for face forgery detection. (a) RAW, high qual-
ity (HQ) and low quality (LQ) real and fake images with the same identity, manipu-
lation artifacts are barely visible in low quality images. (b) Frequency-aware forgery
clues in low quality images using the proposed Frequency-aware Decomposition (FAD)
and Local Frequency Statistics (LFS). (c) ROC Curve of the proposed Frequency in
Face Forgery Network (F3-Net) and baseline (i.e., Xception [12]). The proposed
F3-Net wins the Xception with a large margin. Best viewed in color.
number of channels is identical to the number of frequency bands. As shown
in the last column of Fig. 1(b), the forgery faces have distinct local frequency
statistics than the corresponding real ones, even though they look almost the
same in the RGB images. Moreover, the local frequency statistics also follows
the spatial layouts as the input RGB images, thus also enjoy effective repre-
sentation learning powered by CNNs. Meanwhile, since the decomposed image
components and local frequency statistics are complementary to each other but
both of them share inherently similar frequency-aware semantics, thus they can
be progressively fused during the feature learning process.
Therefore, we propose a novel Frequency in Face Forgery Network (F3-
Net), that capitalizes on the aforementioned frequency-aware forgery clues. The
proposed framework is composed of two frequency-aware branches, one aims at
learning subtle forgery patterns through Frequency-aware Image Decomposition
(FAD), and the other would like to extract high-level semantics from Local Fre-
quency Statistics (LFS) to describe the frequency-aware statistical discrepancy
between real and forged faces. These two branches, are further gradually fused
through a cross-attention module, namely MixBlock, which encourages rich in-
teractions between the aforementioned FAD and LFS branches. The whole face
forgery detection model is learned by the cross-entropy loss in an end-to-end
manner. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed F3-Net signif-
icantly improves the performance over low-quality forgery media with a thor-
ough ablation study. We also show that our framework largely exceeds compet-
ing state-of-the-arts on all compression qualities in the challenging FaceForen-
sics++ [50]. As shown in Fig.1(c), the effectiveness and superiority of the pro-
posed frequency-aware F3-Net is obviously demonstrated by comparing the ROC
curve with Xception [12](baseline, previous state-of-the-art seeing in Sec.4). Our
contributions in this paper are summarized as follows:
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1) Frequency-aware Decomposition (FAD) aims at learning frequency-
aware forgery patterns through frequency-aware image decomposition. The pro-
posed FAD module adaptively partitions the input image in the frequency do-
main according to learnable frequency bands and represents the image with a
series of frequency-aware components.
2) Local Frequency Statistics (LFS) extracts local frequency statistics to
describe the statistical discrepancy between real and fake faces. The localized
frequency statistics not only reveal the unusual statistics of the forgery images
at each frequency band, but also share the structure of natural images, and thus
enable effective mining through CNNs.
3) The proposed framework collaboratively learns the frequency-aware clues
from FAD and LFS, by a cross-attention (a.k.a MixBlock) powered two-stream
networks. The proposed method achieves the state-of-the-art performance on the
challenging FaceForensics++ dataset [50], especially wins a big lead in the low
quality forgery detection.
2 Related Work
With the development of computer graphics and neural networks especially gen-
erative adversarial networks (GANs) [26,8,34,35,11], face forgery detection has
gained more and more interest in our society. Various attempts have been made
for face forgery detection and achieved remarkable progress, but learning-based
generation methods such as NeuralTextures [55] are still difficult to detect be-
cause they introduce only small-scale subtle visual artifacts especially in low
quality videos. To address the problem, various additional information is used
to enhance performance.
Spatial-Based Forgery Detection. To address face forgery detection tasks,
a variety of methods have been proposed. Most of them are based on the spatial
domain such as RGB and HSV. Some approaches [16,9] exploit specific arti-
facts arising from the synthesis process such as color or shape cues. Some stud-
ies [37,44,27] extract color-space features to classify fake and real images. For
example, ELA [27] uses pixel-level errors to detect image forgery. Early meth-
ods [6,14] use hand-crafted features for shallow CNN architectures. Recent meth-
ods [3,33,45,46,43,58,60,30] use deep neural networks to extract high-level infor-
mation from the spatial domain and get remarkable progress. MesoInception-4 [3]
is a CNN-based Network inspired by InceptionNet [54] to detect forged videos.
GANs Fingerprints Analysis [58] introduces deep manipulation discriminator to
discover specific manipulation patters. However, most of them use only spatial
domain information and therefore are not sensitive to subtle manipulation clues
that are difficult to detect in color-space. In our works, we take advantage of
frequency cues to mine small-scale detailed artifacts that are helpful especially
in low-quality videos.
Frequency-Based Forgery Detection. Frequency domain analysis is a clas-
sical and important method in image signal processing and has been widely
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Fig. 2. Overview of the F3-Net. The proposed architecture consists of three novel
methods: FAD for learning subtle manipulation patterns through frequency-aware im-
age decomposition; LFS for extracting local frequency statistics and MixBlock for
collaborative feature interaction.
used in a number of applications such as image classification [53,52,23], ste-
ganalysis [17,10], texture classification [28,25,22] and super-resolution [39,31].
Recently, several attempts have been made to solve forgery detection using fre-
quency cues. Some studies use Wavelet Transform (WT) [7] or Discrete Fourier
Transform (DFT) [59,57,19] to convert pictures to frequency domain and mine
underlying artifacts. For example, Durall et al. [19] extracts frequency-domain
information using DFT transform and averaging the amplitudes of different fre-
quency bands. Stuchi et al. [53] uses a set of fixed frequency domain filters to
extract different range of information followed by a fully connected layer to get
the output. Besides, filtering, a classic image signal processing method, is used
to refine and mine underlying subtle information in forgery detection, which
leverages existing knowledge of the characteristics of fake images. Some studies
use high-pass filters [57,15,29,48], Gabor filters [10,22] etc. to extract features
of interest (e.g. edge and texture information) based on features regarding with
high frequency components. Phase Aware CNN [10] uses hand-crafted Gabor
and high-pass filters to augment the edge and texture features. Universal Detec-
tor [57] finds that significant differences can be obtained in the spectrum between
real and fake images after high-pass filtering. However, the filters used in these
studies are often fixed and hand-crafted thus fail to capture the forgery patterns
adaptively. In our work, we make use of frequency-aware image decomposition
to mine frequency forgery cues adaptively.
3 Our Approach
In this section, we introduce the proposed two kinds of frequency-aware forgery
clue mining methods, i.e., frequency-aware decomposition (in Sec. 3.1) and local
frequency statistics (in Sec. 3.2), and then present the proposed cross-attention
two-stream collaborative learning framework (in Sec. 3.3).
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Fig. 3. (a) The proposed Frequency-aware Decomposition (FAD) to discover salient
frequency components. D indicates applying Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT). D−1
indicates applying Inversed Discrete Cosine Transform (IDCT). Several frequency band
components can be concatenated together to extract a wider range of information. (b)
The distribution of the DCT power spectrum. We flatten 2D power spectrum to 1D
by summing up the amplitudes of each frequency band. We divide the spectrum into
3 bands with roughly equal energy.
3.1 FAD: Frequency-Aware Decomposition
Towards the frequency-aware image decomposition, former studies usually ap-
ply hand-crafted filter banks [10,22] in the spatial domain, thus fail to cover the
complete frequency domain. Meanwhile, the fixed filtering configurations make
it hard to adaptively capture the forgery patterns. To this end, we propose a
novel frequency-aware decomposition (FAD), to adaptively partition the input
image in the frequency domain according to a set of learnable frequency filters.
The decomposed frequency components can be inversely transformed to the spa-
tial domain, resulting in a series of frequency-aware image components. These
components are stacked along the channel axis, and then inputted into a convo-
lutional neural network (in our implementation, we employ an Xception [12] as
the backbone) to comprehensively mine forgery patterns.
To be specific, we manually design N binary base filters {f ibase}Ni=1 (or called
masks) that explicitly partition the frequency domain into low, middle and high
frequency bands. And then we add three learnable filters {f iw}Ni=1 to these base
filters. The frequency filtering is a dot-product between the frequency response
of the input image and the combined filters f ibase + σ(f
i
w), i = {1, . . . , N}, where
σ(x) = 1−exp(−x)1+exp(−x) aims at squeezing x within the range between −1 and +1.
Therefore, to an input image x, the decomposed image components are obtained
by
yi = D−1{D(x) [f ibase + σ(f iw)]}, i = {1, . . . , N}. (1)
 is the element-wise product. We apply D as the Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT) [4], according to its wide applications in image processing, and its nice
layout of the frequency distribution, i.e., low-frequency responses are placed
in the top-left corner, and high-frequency responses are located in the bottom-
right corner. Moreover, recent compression algorithms, such as JPEG and H.264,
usually apply DCT in their frameworks, thus DCT-based FAD will be more
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Fig. 4. (a) The proposed Local Frequency Statistics (LFS) to extract local frequency
domain statistical information. SWDCT indicates applying Sliding Window Discrete
Cosine Transform and H indicates gathering statistics on each grid adaptively. (b)
Extracting statistics from a DCT power spectrum graph, ⊕ indicates element-wise
addition and  indicates element-wise multiplication.
compatible towards the description of compression artifacts out of the forgery
patterns. Observing the DCT power spectrum of natural images, we find that the
spectral distribution is non-uniform and most of the amplitudes are concentrated
in the low frequency area. We apply the base filters fbase to divide the spectrum
into N bands with roughly equal energy, from low frequency to high frequency.
The added learnable {f iw}Ni=1 provides more adaptation to select the frequency
of interest beyond the fixed base filters. Empirically, as shown in Fig. 3(b), the
number of bands N = 3, the low frequency band f1base is the first 1/16 of the
entire spectrum, the middle frequency band f2base is between 1/16 and 1/8 of the
spectrum, and the high frequency band f3base is the last 7/8.
3.2 LFS: Local Frequency Statistics
The aforementioned FAD has provided frequency-aware representation that is
compatible with CNNs, but it has to represent frequency-aware clues back into
the spatial domain, thus fail to directly utilize the frequency information. Also
knowing that it is usually infeasible to mine forgery artifacts by extracting CNN
features directly from the spectral representation, we then suggest to estimate
local frequency statistics (LFS) to not only explicitly render frequency statistics
but also match the shift-invariance and local consistency that owned by natu-
ral RGB images. These features are then inputted into a convolutional neural
network, i.e., Xception [12], to discover high-level forgery patterns.
As shown in Fig. 4(a), we first apply a Sliding Window DCT (SWDCT)
on the input RGB image (i.e., taking DCTs densely on sliding windows of the
image) to extract the localized frequency responses, and then counting the mean
frequency responses at a series of learnable frequency bands. These frequency
statistics re-assemble back to a multi-channel spatial map that shares the same
layout as the input image. This LFS provides a localized aperture to detect
detailed abnormal frequency distributions. Calculating statistics within a set
of frequency bands allows a reduced statistical representation, whilst yields a
smoother distribution without the interference of outliers.
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Fig. 5. The proposed MixBlock. ⊗ indicates matrix multiplication and ⊕ indicates
element-wise addition.
To be specific, in each window p ∈ x , after DCT, the local statistics is
gathered in each frequency band, which is constructed similarly as the way used
in FAD (see Sec. 3.1). In each band, the statistics become
qi = log10 ‖D(p) [hibase + σ(hiw)]‖1, i = {1, . . . ,M}, (2)
Note that log10 is applied to balance the magnitude in each frequency band.
The frequency bands are collected by equally partitioning the spectrum in to M
parts, following the order from low frequency to high frequency. Similarly, hibase
is the base filter, hiw is the learnable filter, i = {1, . . . ,M}. The local frequency
statistics q for a window p is then transposed as a 1 × 1 ×M vector. These
statistics vectors gathered from all windows are re-assembled into a matrix with
downsampled spatial size of the input image, whose number of channels is equal
to M. This matrix will act as the input to the later convolutional layers.
Practically in our experiments, we empirically adopt the window size as 10,
the sliding stride as 2, and the number of bands as M = 6, thus the size of the
output matrix will be 149× 149× 6 if the input image is of size 299× 299× 3.
3.3 Two-stream Collaborative Learning Framework
As mentioned in Sec. 3.1 and Sec. 3.2, the proposed FAD and LFS modules
mine the frequency-aware forgery clues from two different but inherently con-
nected aspects. We argue that these two types of clues are different but comple-
mentary. Thus, we propose a collaborative learning framework that powered by
cross-attention modules, to gradually fuse two-stream FAD and LFS features.
To be specific, the whole network architecture of our F3-Net is composed of two
branches equipped with Xception blocks [12], one is for the decomposed image
components generated by FAD, and the other is for local frequency statistics
generated by LFS, as shown in Fig. 2.
We propose a cross-attention fusion module for the feature interaction and
message passing every several Xception blocks. As shown in Fig. 5, different
from the simple concatenation widely used in previous methods [20,32,60], we
firstly calculate the cross-attention weight using the feature maps from the two
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Table 1. Quantitative results on FaceForensics++ dataset with all quality settings,
i.e. LQ indicates low quality (heavy compression), HQ indicates high quality (light
compression) and RAW indicates raw videos without compression. The bold results are
the best. Note that Xception+ELA and Xception-PAFilters are two Xception baselines
that are equipped with ELA [27] and PAFilters [10].
Methods
Acc
(LQ)
AUC
(LQ)
Acc
(HQ)
AUC
(HQ)
Acc
(RAW)
AUC
(RAW)
Steg.Features [24] 55.98% - 70.97% - 97.63% -
LD-CNN [14] 58.69% - 78.45% - 98.57% -
Constrained Conv [6] 66.84% - 82.97% - 98.74% -
CustomPooling CNN [49] 61.18% - 79.08% - 97.03% -
MesoNet [3] 70.47% - 83.10% - 95.23% -
Face X-ray [40] - 0.616 - 0.874 - -
Xception [12] 86.86% 0.893 95.73% 0.963 99.26% 0.992
Xception-ELA [27] 79.63% 0.829 93.86% 0.948 98.57% 0.984
Xception-PAFilters [10] 87.16% 0.902 - - - -
F3-Net (Xception) 90.43% 0.933 97.52% 0.981 99.95% 0.998
Optical Flow [5] 81.60% - - - - -
Slowfast [20] 90.53% 0.936 97.09% 0.982 99.53% 0.994
F3-Net(Slowfast) 93.02% 0.958 98.95% 0.993 99.99% 0.999
branches. The cross-attention matrix is adopted to augment the attentive fea-
tures from one stream to another.
In our implementation, we use Xception network [12] pretrained on the Ima-
geNet [18] for both branches, each of which has 12 blocks. The newly-introduced
layers and blocks are randomly initialized. The cropped face is adopted as the in-
put of the framework after resized as 299×299. Empirically, we adopt MixBlock
after block 7 and block 12 to fuse two types of frequency-aware clues according
to their mid-level and high-level semantics. We train the F3-Net by the well-
known cross entropy loss, and the whole system can be trained in an end-to-end
fashion.
4 Experiment
4.1 Setting
Dataset. Following previous face forgery detection methods [51,19,40,5], we con-
duct our experiments on the challenging FaceForensics++ [50] dataset. Face-
Forensics++ is a face forgery detection video dataset containing 1,000 real
videos, in which 720 videos are used for training, 140 videos are reserved for
validation and 140 videos for testing. Most videos contain frontal faces without
occlusions and were collected from YouTube with the consent of the subjects.
Each video undergoes four manipulation methods to generate four fake videos,
therefore there are 5,000 videos in total. The number of frames in each video is
between 300 and 700. The size of the real videos is augmented four times to solve
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category imbalance between the real and fake data. 270 frames are sampled from
each video, following the setting as in FF++ [50]. Output videos are generated
with different quality levels, so as to create a realistic setting for manipulated
videos, i.e., RAW, High Quality (HQ) and Low Quality (LQ), respectively.
We use the face tracking method proposed by Face2Face [56] to crop the face
and adopt a conservative crop to enlarge the face region by a factor of 1.3 around
the center of the tracked face, following the setting in [50].
Evaluation Metrics. We apply the Accuracy score (Acc) and Area Under the
Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC) as our evaluation metrics. (1)
Acc. Following FF++ [50], we use the accuracy score as the major evaluation
metric in our experiments. This metric is commonly used in face forgery detection
tasks [3,13,46]. Specifically, for single-frame methods, we average the accuracy
scores of each frame in a video. (2) AUC. Following face X-ray [40], we use AUC
score as another evaluation metric. For single-frame methods, we also average
the AUC scores of each frame in a video.
Implementation Details. In our experiments, we use Xception [12] pretrained
on the ImageNet [18] as backbone for the proposed F3-Net. The newly-introduced
layers and blocks are randomly initialized. The networks are optimized via SGD.
We set the base learning rate as 0.002 and use Cosine [41] learning rate scheduler.
The momentum is set as 0.9. The batch size is set as 128. We train for about
150k iterations.
Some studies [51,5] use videos as the input of the face forgery detection
system. To demonstrate the generalization of the proposed methods, we also
plug LFS and FAD into existing video-based methods, i.e. Slowfast-R101 [20]
pre-trained on Kinetics-400 [36]. The networks are optimized via SGD. We set
the base learning rate as 0.002. The momentum is set as 0.9. The batch size is
set as 64. We train the model for about 200k iterations.
4.2 Comparing with previous methods
In this section, on the FaceForensics++ dataset, we compare our method with
previous face forgery detection methods.
Evaluations on Different Quality Settings. The results are listed in Tab.1.
The proposed F3-Net outperforms all the reference methods on all quality set-
tings, i.e., LQ, HQ and RAW, respectively. According to the low-quality (LQ)
setting, the proposed F3-Net achieves 90.43% in Acc and 0.933 in AUC respec-
tively, with a remarkable improvement comparing to the current state-of-the-art
methods, i.e., about 3.5% performance gain on Acc score against the best per-
formed reference method (i.e., Xception-PAFilters with 87.16% v.s. F3-Net with
90.43%). The performance gains mainly benefit from the information mining
from frequency-aware FAD and LFS clues, which helps the proposed F3-Net
more capable of detecting subtle manipulation artifacts as well as robust to
heavy compression errors than plain RGB-based networks. It is worth noting
that some methods [27,19,45,10] also try to employ complementary information
from other domains, and try to take advantages of prior knowledge. For example,
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Table 2. Quantitative results (Acc) on FaceForensics++ (LQ) dataset with four ma-
nipulation methods, i.e. DeepFakes(DF) [1], Face2Face(F2F) [56], FaceSwap(FS) [2]
and NeuralTextures(NT) [55]). The bold results are the best.
Methods DF [1] F2F [56] FS [2] NT [55]
Steg.Features [24] 67.00% 48.00% 49.00% 56.00%
LD-CNN [14] 75.00% 56.00% 51.00% 62.00%
Constrained Conv [6] 87.00% 82.00% 74.00% 74.00%
CustomPooling CNN [49] 80.00% 62.00% 59.00% 59.00%
MesoNet [3] 90.00% 83.00% 83.00% 75.00%
Xception [12] 96.01% 93.29% 94.71% 79.14%
F3-Net(Xception) 97.97% 95.32% 96.53% 83.32%
Slowfast [20] 97.53% 94.93% 95.01% 82.55%
F3-Net(Slowfast) 98.62% 95.84% 97.23% 86.01%
Real
Fake DF
Fake F2F
Fake FS
Fake NT
(a)
Real
Fake DF
Fake F2F
Fake FS
Fake NT
(b)
Fig. 6. The t-SNE embedding visualization of the baseline (a) and F3-Net (b) on
FaceForensics++ [50] low quality (LQ) task. Red color indicates the real videos, the
rest colors represent data generated by different manipulation methods. Best viewed
in color.
Steg.Features [24] employs hand-crafted steganalysis features and PAFilters [10]
tries to augment the edge and texture features by hand-crafted Gabor and high-
pass filters. Different from these methods, the proposed F3-Net makes good use
of CNN-friendly and adaptive mechanism to augment the FAD and LFS module,
thus significantly boost the performance by a considerable margin
Towards Different Manipulation Types. Furthermore, we evaluate the pro-
posed F3-Net on different face manipulation methods listed in [50]. The models
are trained and tested exactly on the low quality videos from one face manipula-
tion methods. The results are shown in Tab. 2. Of the four manipulation meth-
ods, the videos generated by NeuralTextures (NT) [55] is extremely challenging
due to its excellent generation performance in synthesizing realistic faces without
noticeable forgery artifacts. The performance of our proposed method is partic-
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ID FAD LFS MixBlock Acc AUC
1 - - - 86.86% 0.893
2
√
- - 87.95% 0.907
3 -
√
- 88.73% 0.920
4
√ √
- 89.89% 0.928
5
√ √ √
90.43% 0.933
(a)
(b)
Fig. 7. (a) Ablation study of the proposed F3-Net on the low quality task(LQ). We
compare F3-Net and its variants by removing the proposed FAD, LFS and MixBlock
step by step. (b) ROC Curve of the models in our ablation studies.
ularly impressive when detecting forged faces by NT, leading to an improvement
of about 4.2% on the Acc score, against the baseline method Xception [12].
Furthermore, we also showed the t-SNE [42] feature spaces of data in Face-
Forensics++ [50] low quality (LQ) task, by the Xception and our F3-Net, as
shown in Fig. 6. Xception cannot divide the real data and NT-based forged data
since their features are cluttered in the t-SNE embedding space, as shown in
Fig. 6(a). However, although the feature distances between real videos and NT-
based forged videos are closer than the rest pairs in the feature space of F3-Net,
they are still much farther away than those in the feature space of Xception.
It, from another viewpoint, proves that the proposed F3-Net can mine effective
clues to distinguish the real and forged media.
Video-based Extensions. Meanwhile, there are also several studies [51,5] using
multiple frames as the input. To evaluate the generalizability of our methods, we
involve the proposed LFS and FAD into Slowfast-R101 [20] due to its excellent
performance for video classification. The results are shown in Tab.1 and Tab.2.
More impressively, our F3-Net (Slowfast) achieves the better performances than
the baseline using Slowfast only, i.e., 93.02% and 0.958 of Acc and AUC scores in
comparison to 90.53% and 0.936, in low quality (LQ) task, as shown in Tab. 1.
Slowfast-F3-Net also wins over 3% on the NT-based manipulation, as shown
in Tab. 2, not to mention the rest three manipulation types. These excellent
performances further demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed frequency-
aware face forgery detection method.
4.3 Ablation Study
Effectiveness of LFS, FAD and MixBlock. To evaluate the effectiveness of
the proposed LFS, FAD and MixBlock, we quantitatively evaluate F3-Net and
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Fig. 8. The visualization of the feature map extracted by baseline (i.e., Xception) and
the proposed F3-Net respectively.
its variants: 1) the baseline (Xception), 2) F3-Net w/o LFS and MixBlock, 3)
F3-Net w/o FAD and MixBlock, 4) F3-Net w/o MixBlock.
The quantitative results are listed in Fig. 7(a). By comparing model 1 (base-
line) and model 2 (Xception with FAD), the proposed FAD consistently improves
the Acc and AUC scores. When adding the LFS (model 4) based on model 2,
the Acc and AUC scores become even higher. Plugging MixBlock (model 5)
into the two branch structure (model 4) gets the best performance, 90.43% and
0.933 for Acc and AUC scores, respectively. These progressively improved per-
formances validate that the proposed FAD and LFS module indeed helps the
forgery detection, and they are complementary to each other. MixBlock intro-
duce more advanced cooperation between FAD and LFS, and thus introduce
additional gains. As shown in the ROC curves in Fig. 7(b), F3-Net receives the
best performance at lower false positive rate (FPR), while low FPR rate is a
most challenging scenario to forgery detection system. To better understand the
effectiveness of the proposed methods, we visualize the feature maps extracted
by the baseline (Xception) and F 3-Net, respectively, as shown in Fig. 8. The
discriminativeness of these feature maps is obviously improved by the proposed
F3-Net, e.g., there are clear differences between real and forged faces in the fea-
ture distributions of F3-Net, while the corresponding feature maps generated by
Xception are similar and indistinguishable.
Ablation study on FAD. To demonstrate the benefits of adaptive frequency
decomposition on complete frequency domain in FAD, we evaluate the proposed
FAD and its variants by removing or replacing some components, i.e., 1) Xcep-
tion (baseline), 2) a group of hand-drafted filters used in Phase Aware CNN [10],
denoted as Xception + PAFilters, 3) proposed FAD without learnable filters,
denoted as Xception + FAD (fbase), and 4) Xception with the full FAD, de-
noted as Xception+FAD (fbase + fw). All the experiments are under the same
hyper-parameters for fair comparisons. As shown in the left part of Tab. 3, the
performance of Xception is improved by a considerable margin on the Acc and
AUC scores after applying the FAD, in comparison with other methods using
fixed filters (Xception + PAFilters). If the learnable filters are removed, there
will also be a sudden performance drop.
We further demonstrate the importance of extracting complete information
from complete frequency domain by quantitatively evaluating FAD with different
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Table 3. Ablation study and component analysis on FAD in FF++ low quality (LQ)
tasks. Left: comparing traditional fixed filters with the proposed FAD. Right: compar-
ing FAD and its variants with different kinds of frequency components. We use the full
FAD in model FAD-All.
Models Acc AUC Models Acc AUC
Xception 86.86% 0.893 FAD-Low 86.95% 0.901
Xception+PAFilters [10] 87.16% 0.902 FAD-Mid 87.57% 0.904
Xception+FAD (fbase) 87.12% 0.901 FAD-High 87.77% 0.906
Xception+FAD (fbase + fw) 87.95% 0.907 FAD-All 87.95% 0.907
Table 4. Ablation study on LFS. Here we use only LFS branch and add components
step by step. SWDCT indicates using Sliding Window DCT instead of traditional DCT,
Stat indicates adopting frequency statistics and D-Stat indicates using our proposed
adaptive frequency statistics.
SWDCT Stat D-Stat
Acc
(LQ)
AUC
(LQ)
Acc
(HQ)
AUC
(HQ)
Acc
(RAW)
AUC
(RAW)
- - - 76.16% 0.724 90.12% 0.905 95.28% 0.948√
- - 82.47% 0.838 93.85% 0.940 97.02% 0.964√ √
- 84.89% 0.865 94.12% 0.936 97.97% 0.975√ √ √
86.16% 0.889 94.76% 0.951 98.37% 0.983
kinds of frequency components, i.e., 1) FAD-Low, FAD with low frequency band
components, 2) FAD-Mid, FAD with middle frequency band components, 3)
FAD-High, FAD with high frequency band components and 4) FAD-All, FAD
with all frequency bands components. The quantitative results are listed in the
right part of Tab. 3. By comparing FAD-Low, FAD-Mid and FAD-High, the
model with high frequency band components achieves the best scores, which
indicates that high frequency clues are indubitably helpful for forgery detection.
It is because high-frequent clues are usually correlated with forgery-sensitive
edges and textures. After making use of all three kinds of information (i.e.,
FAD-All), we achieved the highest result. Since the low frequency components
preserve the global picture, the middle and high frequency reveals the small-
scale detailed information, concatenating them together helps to obtain richer
frequency-aware clues and is able to mine forgery patterns more comprehensively.
Ablation study on LFS. To demonstrate the effectiveness of SWDCT and
dynamic statistical strategy in the proposed LFS introduced in Sec. 3.2, we take
the experiments (Xception as backbone) on the proposed LFS and its variants,
1) Baseline, of which the frequency spectrum of the full image by traditional
DCT; 2) SWDCT, adopting the localized frequency response by SWDCT ; 3)
SWDCT+Stat, adopting the general statistical strategy with filters hbase; 4)
SWDCT+Stat+D-Stat, the proposed FAD consisted of SWDCT and the adap-
tive frequency statistics with learnable filters hw. The results are shown in Tab. 4.
Comparing with traditional DCT operation on the full image, the proposed
SWDCT significantly improves the performance by a large margin since it is
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more sensitive to the spatial distributions of the local statistics, and letting the
Xception back capture the forgery clues. The improvement of using the statistics
is significant and local statistics are more robust to unstable or noisy spectra,
especially when optimized by adding the adaptive frequency statistics.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an innovative face forgery detection framework that
can make use of frequency-aware forgery clues, named as F3-Net. The proposed
framework is composed of two frequency-aware branches, one focuses on min-
ing subtle forgery patterns through frequency components partition, and the
other aims at extracting small-scale discrepancy of frequency statistics between
real and forged images. Meanwhile, a novel cross-attention module is applied for
two-stream collaborative learning. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effec-
tiveness and significance of the proposed F3-Net on FaceForencis++ dataset,
especially in the challenging low quality task.
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